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Abstract Bots have been playing a crucial role in online platform ecosystems, as
efficient and automatic tools to generate content and diffuse information to the so-
cial media human population. In this chapter, we will discuss the role of social bots
in content spreading dynamics in social media. In particular, we will first investi-
gate some differences between diffusion dynamics of content generated by bots, as
opposed to humans, in the context of political communication, then study the char-
acteristics of bots behind the diffusion dynamics of social media spam campaigns.
1 Introduction
Social media have received widespread recognition as enablers of modern society
communication [58, 56, 18, 14, 55], as a tool to democratize discussion about poli-
tics [2, 26, 10, 15, 25, 61, 90] and social issues [41, 40, 22, 23, 86, 9, 81], and even
as an effective system to respond to crises and emergencies [78, 91, 38, 92, 57].
The benefits of the rise to popularity of social media are hard to quantify, as they
touch billions of people every day, all over the world. However, as early as 2006,
concerns have been raised regarding the possibility of manipulating public opinion
through social media [44]. Particularly problematic can be the fact that social media
have proved effective in influencing individuals, their believes and behaviors [7,
17, 54, 36, 67]. These concerns have been later proved well grounded by several
scientific studies, which highlighted a variety of manipulation strategies and related
contexts where such forms of abuse can take place [72, 66, 27, 30, 45, 73, 85, 32].
One way to manipulate social media is by using social bots, algorithmically-
controlled accounts that emulate the activity of human users but operate at much
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2 Emilio Ferrara
higher pace (e.g., automatically producing content or engaging in social interac-
tions), while successfully keeping their robotic identity undisclosed [46, 65, 34, 84].
Evidence of the adoption of social media bots to attempt manipulating political
communication dates back nearly a decade: during the 2010 U.S. midterm elec-
tions, social bots were employed to support some candidates and smear others, by
injecting thousands of tweets pointing to websites with fake news [71]. The research
community reported another similar case around the time of the 2010 Massachusetts
special election [66]. Campaigns of this type are sometimes referred to as astroturf
or Twitter bombs. Unfortunately, most of the times, it has proven impossible to
determine who’s behind these types of operations [34, 53, 11]. Governments, orga-
nizations, and other entities with sufficient resources, can obtain the technological
capabilities to deploy thousands of social bots and use them to their advantage, ei-
ther to support or to attack particular political figures or candidates.
Bots have been used in other contexts too, most prominently for social spamming
and social phishing purposes [48, 82, 74, 50, 89, 69, 83]. A large body of scientific
literature covers the challenges related to detecting social spam [63, 39, 94], spam
bots [59, 60, 76, 12], fake reviews [69], etc. Differently from traditional Internet
spam, distributed via email or mailing lists, social spam proliferates in online plat-
forms, and bots have been extensively used to make its diffusion more effective.
Although much work has been devoted to characterize and detect social spam cam-
paigns or spam bots, the interplay between these two, and in particular the effect of
spam bots on the diffusion of spam in social media, has not received much attention.
Contributions of this chapter
This chapter aims at investigating both the directions of social bots influence on po-
litical discussion, and spam bots influence in social spam campaigns. In particular,
we will be concerned with measuring the role and effects of bots in social media
information spreading dynamics. The scope and contributions of this chapter are
therefore threefold:
• We will first review how social bots, and in particular Twitter bots, are created,
how they operate, and what are the challenges in detecting them (see Section §2).
The literature discussed here will be mostly aligned with a recent review paper
we published on Communications of the ACM [34].
• We will then discuss how social bots have been used during the 2016 US Pres-
idential Election to sway the discussion around the presidential candidates, and
to frame agendas and messages attaching particular sentiments. This review (see
Section §3.1) will be based on results we recently published [11].
• Then, we will propose novel analysis of the effects of social spam bots on the
diffusion of social spam campaigns and promotional content on Twitter (see Sec-
tion §3.2). We will investigate the differences between traditional spammers and
social spam bots, provide a characterization of their most typical features, and
describe their effect of the diffusion of social spam on Twitter.
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2 What Social Bots are and How They Operate
How to create a social spam bot
In the early days of online social media, over one decade ago, creating a bot was not
a simple task: a skilled programmer would need to sift through various platforms’
documentation to create a software capable of automatically interfacing with the
platform and operate functions in a human-like manner. For example, in 2009, we
spent significant amounts of efforts to create a simple bot that would navigate Face-
book pages and extract basic publicly-available social network information [16]:
that required the application of sophisticated Web scripting techniques [33] in con-
junction with a trial-and-error approach to deal with the Web platform infrastructure.
Similar efforts have been reported for other such type of early endeavors [20, 4]
These days, the landscape has completely changed: indeed, it has become in-
creasingly simpler to deploy social bots, so that, in some cases, no coding skills are
required to setup accounts that perform simple automated activities: tech blogs of-
ten post tutorials and ready-to-go tools for this purposes. Various source codes for
sophisticated social media bots can be found online as well, ready to be customized
and optimized by the more technically-savvy users [53].
We inspected same of the readily-available Twitter bot-making tools and this is a
(non-comprehensive) list of capabilities they provide:
• Search Twitter for phrases/hashtags/keywords and automatically retweet them;
• Automatically reply to tweets that meet a certain criteria;
• Automatically follow any users that tweet something with a specific hashtag,
keyword, or phrase;
• Automatically follow back any users that have followed the bot;
• Automatically follow any users that follow a specified user;
• Automatically add users tweeting about something to public lists;
• Search Google (and other engines) for articles/news according to specific criteria
and post them, or link them in automatic replies to other users;
• Automatically aggregating public sentiment on certain topics of discussion;
• Buffer and post tweets automatically.
Most of these bots can run within cloud services or infrastructures like Amazon
Web Services (AWS) or Heroku, making it more difficult to block them when they
violate the Terms of Service of the platform where they are deployed.
Finally, a very recent trend is that of providing Bot-As-A-Service (BaaS): compa-
nies like RoboLike1 provide “Easy-to-use Instagram/Twitter auto bots” performing
certain automatic activities for a monthly price. Advanced conversational bots pow-
ered by sophisticated Artificial Intelligence are provided by companies like Chat-
Bots.io that allow anyone to “Add a bot to services like Twitter, Hubot, Facebook,
Skype, Twilio, and more”.2
1 RoboLike: https://robolike.com/
2 Pandora bot: https://developer.pandorabots.com/
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How to detect social bots
The detection of social bots in online social media platform has proven a challenging
task. For this reason, it has attracted a lot of attention from the computing research
community. Even DARPA became interested to the point that a DARPA Challenge
was organized, namely the 2016 DARPA Twitter Bot Detection [77]: over one dozen
academic and industry teams participated, with University of Maryland, University
of Southern California, and Indiana University topping the challenge.
For these reasons, the literature on social bot detection has become very exten-
sive. We tried to summarize the most relevant approaches in a survey paper recently
appeared on Communications of the ACM [34]: we refer the interested reader to that
review for a deeper analysis of this problem.
In our review, we proposed a simple taxonomy to divide the social bot detection
approaches proposed in literature into three classes: (i) bot detection systems based
on social network information; (ii) system based on crowd-sourcing and leveraging
human intelligence; (iii) machine learning methods based on the identification of
highly-revealing features that discriminate between bots and humans. In the follow-
ing, we report some examples of these three classes.
Graph-based social bot detection.
Social bot detection has been framed as an adversarial setting [6]: an adversary may
control multiple social bots to impersonate different identities and infiltrate a sys-
tem. Proposed detection strategies often rely on examining the structure of a social
graph, and assume that bot accounts exhibit a small number of links to legitimate
users, connecting mostly to other bots. This feature is exploited to identify densely
interconnected groups of bots. Yet, a wise attacker may counterfeit the connectiv-
ity of the controlled bot accounts; this strategy would make the attack invisible to
thse detection methods. To address this shortcoming, some systems also employ
the paradigm of innocent by association: an account interacting with a legitimate
user is considered itself legitimate. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of such detec-
tion strategies is bound by the behavioral assumption that legitimate users refuse
to interact with unknown accounts. This was proven unrealistic by various exper-
iments [76, 13, 29]. On other platforms like Twitter and Tumblr, connecting and
interacting with strangers is one of the main features. In these circumstances, the
innocent-by-association paradigm yields high false positive rates. Moreover, real-
world platforms may contain many mixed groups of legitimate users who fell prey of
some bots [6], and sophisticated bots may succeed in large-scale infiltration making
it impossible to detect them solely from network structure information. Despite its
high false-positive rate, social network information can complement other sources
of information to improve prediction accuracy, as demonstrated by prior work [34].
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Crowd-sourcing social bot detection
Some authors suggested crowd-sourcing social bot detection, assuming that it would
be a simple task for humans to evaluate an account’s behavior and to observe emerg-
ing patterns and anomalies associated with bots [88]. Using data from Facebook and
Renren (a popular Chinese online social network), the authors tested the efficacy of
human detectors, using both expert annotators and workers hired online. Although
this strategy exhibited a near-zero false positive rate, it has proven unfeasible for
several reasons: for existing platform with large user bases, like Facebook and Twit-
ter, manually verify millions of suspicious accounts has a prohibitive cost; even
if large social network companies could afford to hire teams of analysts for this
purpose [75], such cost might not be sustainable for small social networks in their
early stages; finally, exposing personal information to online workers for annotation
would raise privacy issue [28].
Feature-based social bot detection
Encoding behavioral patterns into features, in conjunction with machine learning
techniques to learn the signature of human and bot behavior, may be the most pop-
ular bot detection strategy. One example of feature-based system is represented by
Bot or Not: released in 2014, and constantly updated, this was the first Twitter bot
detection tool to be made publicly available [24].3 Bot or Not implements a detection
algorithm relying upon highly-predictive features capturing a variety of suspicious
behaviors to separate social bots from humans. The system employs off-the-shelf
supervised learning algorithms trained with examples of both humans and bots be-
haviors. In addition to the classification results, Bot or Not provides a variety of
interactive visualizations that yield insights on the features exploited by the system.
We will later describe how we used Bot or Not for our studies.
Bots are continuously changing and evolving: the analysis of the highly-predictive
behaviors that feature-based detection systems can detect may reveal interesting pat-
terns and provide unique opportunities to understand how to discriminate between
bots and humans. User meta-data are considered among the most predictive features
and the most interpretable ones [46, 88]: we can suggest few rules of thumb to infer
whether an account is likely a bot, by comparing its meta-data with that of legiti-
mate users. Further work, however, will be needed to detect sophisticated strategies
exhibiting a mixture of humans and social bots features (sometimes referred to as
cyborgs). Detecting these bots, or hacked accounts [93], is currently impossible for
feature-based systems. Recent studies suggested that some advanced social bots may
no longer aim at mimicking human behavior, but rather at misdirecting attention to
irrelevant information [1]: such smoke screening strategies, requiring high degree of
coordination among bots, can also escape feature-based detection systems.
3 http://truthy.indiana.edu/botornot
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3 Applications and Case Studies
In the following, we present two case studies. We first study the use of social bots in
the context of the 2016 US Presidential Election (cf. Section §3.1). The results we
present are based on recently published work [11]. Then, we discuss new results on
the effect of bots on the diffusion of social media spam (cf. Section §3.2).
3.1 Case study 1: Political campaigns
In the introduction of this chapter, we discussed at length the widespread abuse
of social media platforms. In the context of political campaigns, one could try to
boost the popularity of a candidate, for example by creating the impression that
there is an organic support behind that candidate; however, the apparent support can
be artificially generated by means of orchestrated campaigns. This phenomonon
is commonly referred to as astroturf, and it has long-lasting roots, starting from
offline campaigns [62], and evolving, during more recent times, into various forms
of Internet [52] and social media [72] campaigns. We report our study of social
media astroturf in the context of the 2016 US Presidential Election next, with a
special focus on the role of social bots. We discuss data collection first, then we go
over the employed bot detection and sentiment analysis approaches. The case study
concludes with some discussion of the insights our analysis yielded.
Data Collection
We manually crafted a list of hashtags and keywords related to the 2016 US Presi-
dential Election. The list was compiled so that to contain a roughly equal number of
hashtags/keywords associated with each major presidential candidate: we selected
23 terms in total, including 5 terms specifically for the Republican Party nom-
inee Donald Trump (#donaldtrump, #trump2016, #neverhillary, #trumppence16,
#trump), 4 terms for the Democratic Party nominee Hillary Clinton (#hillaryclinton,
#imwithher, #nevertrump, #hillary), and several terms relative to the four presiden-
tial debates. The full list of search terms is reported in our paper [11]. By querying
the Twitter Search API at regular intervals of 10 seconds, continuously and without
interruptions in three periods between September 16 and October 21, 2016, we col-
lected a large dataset constituted by 20.7 million tweets posted by nearly 2.8 million
distinct users. We used the Twitter Search API4 to obtain all tweets that contain the
search terms, posted during the data collection period, rather than a sample of un-
filtered tweets: this avoids incurring in the issues reported in the literature related to
collecting sample data from the Twitter Stream API5 instead [68].
4 Twitter Search API: https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/search
5 Twitter Stream API: https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
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Bot detection
Determining whether either human or a bot controls a social media account has
proven a very challenging task [34, 77]. Our prior efforts produced an openly ac-
cessible solution called Bot Or Not [24], consisting of a Python API6 and a Web-
site.7 As we briefly discussed earlier, Bot Or Not is a machine-learning framework
that extracts and analyses a set of over one thousand features, spanning content and
network structure, temporal activity, user profile data, and sentiment analysis to pro-
duce a score that suggests the likelihood that the inspected account is indeed a social
bot. Extensive analysis revealed that the two most important classes of feature to de-
tect bots are, maybe unsurprisingly, the metadata and usage statistics associated with
the user accounts.
The following indicators provide the strongest signals to separate bots from hu-
mans: (i) whether the public Twitter profile looks like the default one or it is cus-
tomized (it requires some human efforts to customize the profile, therefore bots are
more likely to exhibit the default profile setting); (ii) absence of geographical meta-
data (humans often use smartphones and the Twitter iPhone/Android App, which
records as digital footprint the physical location of the mobile device); (iii) and ac-
tivity statistics such as total number of tweets and frequency of posting (bots exhibit
incessant activity and excessive amounts of tweets), proportion of retweets over
original tweets (bots retweet contents much more frequently than generating new
tweets), proportion of followers over followees (bots usually have less followers and
more followees), account creation date (bots are more likely to have recently-created
accounts), randomness of the username (bots are likely to have randomly-generated
usernames). We point the reader interested in further technical details to our prior
work [34, 24].
Bot Or Not has been trained with thousands of instances of social bots, from
simple to sophisticated, and an accuracy of above 95% [24]. Typically, Bot Or Not
yields likelihood scores above fifty percent only for accounts that look suspicious
to a scrupulous analysis. We adopted the Python Bot Or Not API to systematically
inspect the most active users in our dataset. The Python Bot Or Not API queries
the Twitter API to extract the most 300 tweets and all the publicly available ac-
count metadata, and feed this features to an ensemble of machine learning classi-
fiers, which produce a bot score. To label accounts as bots, we use the fifty-percent
threshold—which has proven effective in prior studies [34, 24]—an account is con-
sidered to be a bot if the bot score is above 0.5.
Since the Python Bot Or Not API incurs in the query limitations imposed by the
Twitter API, it would have been impossible to test all the 2.78 million accounts.
Therefore, we tested the top 50 thousand accounts ranked by activity volume. Al-
though these top 50 thousand users account for roughly only 2% of the entire pop-
ulation, it is worth noting that they are responsible for producing over 12.6 million
tweets, which is about 60% of the total conversation. This choice gives us sufficient
6 Bot or Not Python API: https://github.com/truthy/botornot-python
7 Bot or Not Website: https://truthy.indiana.edu/botornot/
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statistical power to extrapolate the distribution of bots and humans for the entire
population without the need to test accounts that are only marginally involved in the
conversation. Out of the top 50 thousand accounts, Bot Or Not assigned a bot score
greater than the established 0.5 threshold, and therefore classified as likely bots, to
a total of 7,183 users, responsible for 2,330,252 tweets. A total of 40,163 users (re-
sponsible for 10.3 million tweets) were labeled as humans. Bot Or Not labeled the
remainder 2,654 users as unknown/undecided, either because their scores does not
significantly diverge from the classification threshold of 0.5, or because the accounts
have been suspended/deleted. Even if all the 2,654 users were bots, and Twitter sus-
pended their accounts for violating the terms of service, this would suggest that
roughly 70% of the total bot population (the remainder 7,183 accounts) was still
active on the platform at the time of our verification. By extrapolating for the entire
population, we estimate the presence of at least 400 thousand bots, accounting for
roughly 15% of the total Twitter population active in the U.S. presidential election
discussion, and responsible for about 3.8 million tweets, roughly 19% of the total
volume. Additional statistics are summarized in our paper [11].
Sentiment analysis
To understand how bots and humans discuss about the presidential candidates we
will rely upon sentiment analysis. To attach a sentiment score to the tweets in
our dataset, we used SentiStrength [80]. SentiStrength is a sentiment analysis al-
gorithm which has been specifically designed to annotate social media data. This
design choice provides some desirable advantages: first, it is optimized to anno-
tate short, informal texts, like tweets, that contain abbreviations, slang, and other
non-orthodox language features; second, SentiStrength employs additional linguis-
tic rules for negations, amplifications, booster words, emoticons, spelling correc-
tions, etc. Applications of SentiStrength to social media data found it particularly
effective at capturing positive and negative emotions with, respectively, 60.6% and
72.8% accuracy [79]. We tested it extensively and also used it in prior studies to
validate the effect of sentiment on the diffusion of information in social media [36].
The algorithm assigns to each tweet t a positive P+(t) and negative P−(t) polarity
score, both ranging between 1 (neutral) and 5 (strongly positive/negative). Starting
from the polarity scores, we capture the emotional dimension of each tweet t with
one single measure, the sentiment score S(t), defined as the difference between pos-
itive and negative polarity scores: S(t) = P+(t)−P−(t). The above-defined score
ranges between -4 and +4. The negative extreme indicates an strongly negative
tweet, and occurs when P+(t) = 1 and P−(t) = 5. Vice-versa, the positive extreme
identifies a strongly positive tweet labeled with P+(t) = 5 and P−(t) = 1. In the
case P+(t) = P−(t)—positive and negative sentiment scores for a tweet t are the
same—the sentiment S(t) = 0 of tweet t is considered as neutral (note that the neu-
tral class represent the majority, by construction, since it contains all tweets that
have equal number of positive and negative words, as well as all tweets with no
sentiment-labeled terms).
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Fig. 1 Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of replies interactions generated
by bots (left) and humans (right) (published in Bessi & Ferrara, 2016 [11]).
Fig. 2 Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of retweets interactions generated
by bots (left) and humans (right) (published in Bessi & Ferrara, 2016 [11]).
Partisanship and Supporting Activity
We next inferred the partisanship of the users in our dataset. We used the 5 Trump-
supporting hashtags (#donaldtrump, #trump2016, #neverhillary, #trumppence16,
#trump) and the 4 Clinton-supporting (#hillaryclinton, #imwithher, #nevertrump,
#hillary) to attribute partisanships. In detail, we employed a simple heuristics based
on hashtag adoption: for each user, we calculated the top 10 hashtags that appear
in the tweets posted by that user. If the majority of hashtags support one particular
candidate, we assigned the given user to that political faction (Clinton- or Trump-
supporter). This is a very strict and conservative partisanship assignment, likely less
prone to misclassification that may be yield by automatic machine-learning tech-
niques not based on manual validation, e.g., [21]. Our procedure yielded a small,
high-confidence, annotated dataset constituted by 7,112 Clinton supporters (590
bots and 6,522 humans) and 17,202 Trump supporters (1,867 bots and 15,335 hu-
mans).
Analytic insight 1: Human vs. Bot engagement
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions
(CCDFs) of the interactions respectively replies and retweets, initiated by bot and
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human users. Each plot disaggregates the interactions in three categories: (i) within
group (for example bot-bot, or human-human); (ii) across groups (e.g., bot-human,
or human-bot); and, (iii) total (i.e., bot-all and human-all). Both figures exhibit broad
distributions typical of social media activity. What interestingly emerges from con-
trasting the two figures, is that humans are engaging in replies interactions signifi-
cantly more (one order of magnitude difference) with other humans than with bots
(see right panel of Figure 1). Conversely, bots fail to substantially engage humans
and end up interacting via replies with other bots significantly more than with hu-
mans. Given that bots by design are intended to engage in interactions with humans,
our observation goes against what we would have intuitively expected—similar
paradoxes have been highlighted in our prior work [34]. One intuitive explanation
to this phenomenon is that bots that are not sophisticated enough, cannot produce
engaging-enough questions to foster meaningful discussions with humans. Figure 2,
however, demonstrates that rebroadcasting is a much more effective channel of in-
formation spreading: there is no significant difference in the amounts of retweets
that humans generate by rebroadcasting content produced by other humans or by
bots. In fact, humans and bots retweet each other substantially at the same rate.
This suggests that bots are being very effective at spreading information in the hu-
man population, which could have some nefarious consequences in the cases when
humans fail at verifying the correctness and accuracy of such information and infor-
mation sources.
Analytic insight 2: Human vs. Bot sentiment
To further understand how social media users (both bots and humans) are talking
about the two presidential candidates, we explore the sentiment that the tweets con-
vey. To this purpose, we rely upon sentiment analysis and in particular on Sen-
tiStrength. Figure 3 shows four panels: the top two panels illustrate the sentiment of
the tweets produced by the bots, while the bottom two panels show the same infor-
mation for tweets generated by humans. Furthermore, the two left panels show the
support to Hillary Clinton (respectively by bots and humans), whereas the two right
panel show the support to Donald Trump (respectively by bots and humans). The
main histograms in each panel show the volume of tweets about Clinton or Trump,
separately, whereas the insets show the difference between the two (this to illustrate
the disproportion in support of the candidate of one’s factions, as opposed to the
other candidate). What appears evident from contrasting the left and right panels is
that, on average, the tweets produced by Trump’s supporters are significantly more
positive than that of Clinton’s supporters, regardless of whether the source is human
or bot. If we focus on Trump’s bot supporters, we note that they generate almost
no negative tweets; they indeed produce the most positive set of tweets in the en-
tire dataset—a very significant fraction of these non-negative bot-generated tweets
(about 200,000 or nearly two-third of the total) are in support of Donald Trump. This
generates a stream of support that is at staggering odds with respect to the overall
negative tone that characterizes the 2016 presidential election campaigns. The fact
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Fig. 3 Distributions of the sentiment of bots (top) and humans (bottom) supporting the two presi-
dential candidates. The main histograms show the disaggregated volumes of tweets talking about
the two candidates separately, while the insets show the absolute value of the difference between
them (published in Bessi & Ferrara, 2016 [11]).
that bots produce systematically more positive content in support of a candidate can
bias the perception of the individuals exposed to it, suggesting that there exists an
organic, grassroots support for a given candidate, while in reality it is all artificially
generated. Some interesting insights emerge also from the analysis of Clinton’s sup-
porters: on average, human-generated tweets show slightly more positive sentiment
toward the candidate than the bot-generated ones. Overall, a more natural distri-
bution of tweets’ sentiment emerges from the two groups of bots and human sup-
porters, with a roughly equal number of positive and negative tweets being present
in the pro-Clinton discussion. To further understand these dynamics, we manually
analyzed two hashtags, namely #NeverTrump and #NeverHillary, as emblematic
examples of campaigns explicitly devoted to target the candidate of one’s opposing
political leaning. The hashtag #NeverTrump, used by supporters of the Democratic
Candidate Hillary Clinton, accrued 105,906 positive tweets, and 118,661 negative
ones, roughly an equal split; on the other hand, the hashtag #NeverHillary pushed
by Trump’s supporters generated significantly more negative tweets (204,418) than
positive ones (171,877). The paper [11] reports various examples of tweets gener-
ated by bots, and the candidate they support. A final consideration emerges when
contrasting the pro-Clinton and pro-Trump factions: the former focuses much more
on their candidate, with a significant number of tweets referring to Clinton. Con-
versely, pro-Trump supporters (humans and bots) devote a significant number of
tweets to their opponent: in fact, the majority of negative tweets generated by both
humans and bots are addressing Hillary Clinton.
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3.2 Case study 2: Social Spam Campaigns
In the second part of this chapter, we study social spam campaigns. The widespread
use of social media makes them an ideal target as a vector to diffuse spam cam-
paigns. Indeed, spam has evolved, moving away from traditional vectors like emails
and mailinglists [43], due to the increasing effectiveness of email spam filters, and
migrating to social platforms like social media [39, 19, 94] and digital market-
places [51, 70, 64], etc. In the former scenario, the use of bots has been documented
to generate artificial promotional campaigns, to advertise dubious products (whose
sale is sometimes illicit), etc. In the latter, bots are exploited to generate and diffuse
fake product reviews. Next, we study social media spam, focusing on the effects of
social bots in the diffusion of spam campaigns on Twitter. We first discuss social
spam data collection, then introduce a tool named dynamical activity-connectivity
map we recently proposed to study the mechanisms of influence in social media. We
conclude studying spam campaigns’ sentiment and its interplay with bots’ efficacy.
Data Collection
Similarly to the political discussion scenario, we manually crafted a list of hashtags
and keywords to collect our data. We focused on the tobacco-related discussion,
and in particular electronic cigarettes. We identified this case study by noticing
how spam seems to be a pervasive presence in this topic of discussion on Twit-
ter [5]. The list included over one hundred terms covering nicotine-related prod-
ucts (e.g., tobacco, cigar, cigarettes, etc.), electronic cigarettes (multiple variants
like ecig, e-cig, ecigs, e-cigs, e-cigarette, ecigarette, etc.), vaping products (e.g.,
vape, ehookah, ejuices, eliquids, etc.), popular vaping brands (e.g., green smoke, ev-
ersmoke, etc.), health-related terms (e.g., second-hand smoke, second-hand vape),
health campaigns terms (e.g., still blowing smoke, not blowing smoke, tobacco free
kids, etc.), and more. We queried the Search API at regular intervals from January
1 to September 30, 2015 and collected a large dataset constituted by over 9 million
unique tweets.
Spam Detection
Detecting social spam has proven a challenging and tedious task. The lack of a
rigorous definition of what spam is makes detection a complex problem. Although
various detection techniques have been proposed in the machine learning literature,
they carry some limitations: they are either outdated, being trained and tested on
early (2008-2010) Twitter spam data [59, 60, 76, 12], or overly-specific to detect
certain types of campaigns [63, 39, 94, 35]. The first limitation becomes a problem
due to the fact that bots evolve, becoming increasingly sophisticated thus rendering
detection less effective if training data is not current; the latter issue hinders the
applicability of detection systems to a broader range of problem domains.
Measuring social spam and the effect of bots on information diffusion in social media 13
For the reasons above, to detect spam campaigns in our data and separate legiti-
mate tobacco-related discussion from social spam, we implemented a novel strategy.
We first performed traditional data cleaning operations on the texts of the tweets
in our dataset, namely removing stop-words and punctuation, then tokenizing and
stemming the terms. Afterwards, we elaborated the following iterative 3-stages de-
tection procedure:
1. We generated a list of keywords appearing in the tweets, ranked by frequency.
2. Then, two independent human annotators manually identified and labeled key-
words associated to spam campaigns appearing in the list of the top 250 most
common keywords (to provide contextual information, the annotators had access
to the full text of some example tweets where such keywords occur).
3. Finally, all tweets containing spam-associated keywords are moved into a sepa-
rate repository that we will call spam dataset; the iterative process then restarts.
It is worth noting that, at each next iteration of the algorithm, the ranked list of
keywords changes because the spam keywords identified at stage 2 are removed.
The process ended when the list of top 250 most common keywords did not
contain any spam-associated term. This yielded a manually-curated list of 87 spam
keywords,8 that appear in the spam dataset accounting for 3.06M unique tweets
posted by over 850 thousand distinct users. Of these users, about 74K posted more
than one tweet. We will focus our attention, for the rest of our analysis, on these
74K active spammers.
The top 10 most recurring spam keywords, in order of frequency, are: win, dvd,
movies, giveaway, deals, horror, bluray, ebay, gameofthrones, movie. Manual in-
spection of the 87 keywords suggests that three main types of social media spam
campaigns occur in this scenario:
• Tobacco-related product promotions (sales, coupons, discount codes, etc.);
• Tobacco-unrelated product promotions (sales, coupons, discount codes, etc.), in
particular related to entertainment products (dvd, music, books, etc.);
• Topic-hijacking campaigns, i.e., spam that includes tobacco-related keywords
to attract the attention of users to tweets related to completely different top-
ics, including movies and TV shows (keywords like gameofthrones, fiftyshades,
hungergames, celebs, ageofultron, insurgent, and many others), and offline news
events (e.g., charlestonshooting, ericgarner).
The phenomenon of Twitter hashtag hijacking has been documented exten-
sively [19, 42, 49, 47]. In the following analysis, we do not make a specific dis-
tinction between different types of spam campaigns. However, in the future, we will
try to determine whether campaign types, as well as different scopes and intents lead
to different social spam dynamics.
8 The combination of the top 250 non-spam keywords, plus the 87 spam keywords, accounts for
over 90% of all tweets in the original dataset.
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Fig. 4 Timeline of the volume of spam tweets per day during the observation period. The inset
shows the cumulative count. A few drops visible in April and May are associated with Twitter data
collection service outages.
Descriptive Data Statistics
Our initial exploratory analysis aims at highlighting the temporal dynamics of so-
cial spam production. Figure 4 shows the timeline of the volume of spam tweets per
day in our dataset. Overall, we can note a mild upward trend over the course of the
9 months of observation. By the end of the year, the volume of tweets per day is
roughly twice that of the beginning. This growth suggests the effectiveness of social
spam in the tobacco-related context: if ineffective, the cost associated with running
social spam campaigns would outweigh their benefits and therefore we would ob-
serve declining trends.
After assessing that social spam was “alive and well” during our analysis period,
we moved forward to provide a statistical characterization of the actors therein in-
volved: the Twitter spammers. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the average number
of posted tweets, obtained retweets, number of followers and friends, and follower
vs. friend ratio, for the set of users in our spam dataset. The averages are calculated
across the 9-month observation period. A few observations are in order. Firstly, al-
though all distributions exhibit the heavy tails typical of social networks [8, 3], some
are significantly different from others. For example, the distribution of posted tweets
is somewhat unexpected; if compared with the distribution of obtained retweets,
which exhibits the typical power-law like behavior (i.e., a truncated straight line in
the log-log plot of Figure 5), the distribution of posted tweets appear anomalous.
In particular, it appears that there is roughly the same probability of observing ac-
counts with a number of posted tweets that spans from a few to over ten thousands:
this is represented by the nearly-flat slope of the blue solid curve in the regime
10≤ x < 104. After that point, the probability decreases very rapidly. This unusual
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Fig. 5 Distributions of the average number of tweets, retweets, followers, friends, and follower vs
friend ratio of the users in our spam dataset.
behavior is commonly linked to the activity of social bots. Their activity, however,
does not catch up with the lack of influence they are typically characterized by, and
therefore the amount of average retweets that most of these accounts receive is or-
ders of magnitude lesser than the amount of tweets they post. Concluding, both the
friends and follower distribution exhibit uncommon shapes, suggesting the presence
of two different regimes, one for 10 ≤ x < 103 and one for x ≥ 103. The slope in
the former regime is nearly flat, whereas in the latter both distributions decay with
more typical heavy tails suggesting the presence of accounts with a very large num-
ber of friends and followers, another interesting behavior associated with two types
of users: influential individuals, or social bots. Next, we study in detail the relation
between activity and connectivity patterns.
Dynamical Activity-Connectivity Maps
The analysis above was static: taking the average values of the five features above
made the results oblivious of the temporal dynamics of activity and connectivity as
they unfold over the observation time. We now plan to investigate what effect the
progression of activity levels of a user has on their connectivity evolution (and vicev-
ersa). In Figure 6 we provide a Dynamical Activity-Connectivity map: we recently
introduced this type of maps [31, 86] as dynamic variants of the map proposed by
Gonzalez-Bailon and collaborators—see Figure 4 in the paper titled Broadcasters
and Hidden Influentials in Online Protest Diffusion [40].
Figure 6 shows the probability density of users in the two-dimensional space
where the x-axis represents the growth of network connectivity, and the y-axis con-
veys the messaging activity rate. For a given user u, xu and yu are here defined as
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Fig. 6 Dynamical activity-connectivity map of the users in our dataset. The x axis represents the
proportional variation of followers/friends for each user over the accounted time period. The y axis
represents the proportional variation of received/posted tweets of each user over the time period.
xu =
1+δ fu
1+δFu
and yu =
1+δ rtu
1+δ tu
.
We use the notations fu and Fu to identify the number of followers and friends, re-
spectively, of a user u. The variations of followers and friends of user u over a period
of time t are thus defined as δ fu = f
max
u − f minu
t and δFu =
Fmaxu −Fminu
t ; the length of time
t is defined as the number of days of u’s activity, measured from registration to last
observed activity (this varies from user to user). Finally, the variations of received
retweets, and posted tweets, are defined as δ rtu = rt
max
u −rtminu
t and δ tu =
tmaxu −tminu
t re-
spectively, where rtu and tu are the number of obtained retweets and posted tweets
by user u during the period of activity t.
All values are added to the unit to avoid zero-divisions and to allow for logarith-
mic scaling (i.e., in those cases where the variation is zero). The “heat” (the color
intensity) in the map represents the joint probability density pd f (x,y) for users with
given values of x and y. The plot also introduce a bin normalization to account for
the logarithmic binning.
The Dynamical Activity-Connectivity map we conceived is interpreted as follows:
the bulk of the joint probability density mass should be observed in the neighbor-
hood of (1,1), as the majority of accounts would usually exhibit a comparable vari-
ation along the two dimensions. That would be in line with what all previous social
media studies where this type of map was employed reported [40, 31, 86]. However,
the results Figure 6 shows are unprecedented: we hypothesize that this is due to the
spam dynamics characterizing this dataset. Let us discuss the two dimensions of
connectivity growth and activity rate separately.
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The connectivity growth is captured by the x axis and, in our case, ranges roughly
between 10−2 and 102. Users for which x > 1 (i.e., 100) are those with a follower-
ship that grows much faster than the rate at which these users are following others.
In other words, they are acquiring social network popularity (followers) at a fast-
paced rate. Note that, if a user is acquiring many followers quickly, but s/he is also
following many users at a similar rate, the value of x will be near 1. This is a good
property of our measure because it is common strategy on social media platforms,
especially among bots [34, 11], to indiscriminately follow others in order to seek for
reciprocal followerships. Our Dynamical Activity-Connectivity map will discrimi-
nate users with fast-growing followerships, who will appear in the right-hand side of
the map, from those who adopt that type of reciprocity-seeking strategy. The former
group can be associated with highly popular users with a fast-paced followership
growth. According to Gonzalez-Bailon and collaborators [40] this category is com-
posed by two groups: influential users and information broadcasters, depending on
their activity rates. Values of x < 1 indicate users who follow others at a rate higher
than that they are being followed; they fall in the left-hand side of the map. Ac-
cording to Gonzalez-Bailon and collaborators, these are mostly the common users,
although the so-called hidden influentials also sit in this low-connectivity regime.
As for what concerns the y axis, it measures the activity rate, i.e., the rate at which
a user receives retweets versus how frequently s/he tweets. Users with values of y >
1 are those who receive systematically more retweets with respect to how frequently
they tweet. This group of users can be referred to as influentials, i.e., those who are
referred to significantly more frequently than others in the conversation; they fall in
the upper region of the map, and according to Gonzalez-Bailon et al., depending on
their connectivity growth can be divide in influential (x > 1) and hidden influential
(x < 1) users. Conversely, users with values of y < 1 are those who post exceedingly
more tweets than the retweets they receive. This group would generally represents
the common-user behavior (x < 1), although information broadcasters (x > 1) also
exhibit the same low-activity rate. These users fall in the lower region of the map.
Now that a reading of dynamical activity-connectivity maps has been provided,
we can proceed with interpreting Figure 6: the bottom-left quadrant reports the most
common users, those with both activity and connectivity growth lesser than 1. In our
case, we identify these accounts as traditional spammers. Manual validation of some
of these accounts revealed that they employ simple automatic posting strategies,
thus they generate a very large number of tweets, but they never attract other users’
attention and thus they are rarely retweeted. We identified over 27K such accounts.
Conversely, the upper-right quadrant reports users with the higher connectivity
growth and activity rates. These are influential accounts: they systematically at-
tract other users’ attention by receiving lots of retweets compared with how often
they tweet, and their followerships grow at a very fast pace. Influential users are
quite rare in this context, and in fact we identified only 438 users according to our
method. Manual inspection of all these users revealed that our technique correctly
detects influential users which are not bots: accounts in this category include offi-
cial accounts of movies and TV shows (e.g., Avengers, CaptainAmerica, Divergent,
GameOfThrones, etc.), and various official accounts of tobacco-related sellers.
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Fig. 7 Box plot of the distributions of posted tweets, obtained retweets, number of friends and
followers, and follower/friend ratio for the main three classes of users in our spam dataset.
Lastly, social spam bots sit in the bottom-right quadrant. Differently from tra-
ditional spammers, their connectivity growth is much more similar to that of influ-
ential accounts. Their followership increases at a pace higher than their following
others. They still produce disproportionately more tweets than the retweets they re-
ceive, but their embeddedness in the social network looks somewhat effective. Fur-
ther analysis reveals that many of these spam bots tend to reciprocate followership
to external users (accounts not present in the spam dataset) but also tend to follow
each other; this coordinated behavior gives the appearance of network influence. We
identified over 46K social spammers, the majority class by far in our spam dataset.
Finally, we detected only 47 hidden influentials, too few to warrant further analysis.
Figure 7 provides a different view on the five features characterizing the users
in the three classes. As opposed to spammers, influential users receive significantly
more attention (retweets), significantly more followers than friends (thus a much
higher followers/friends ratio), and on average post one order of magnitude fewer
tweets than bots. Concluding, the only significant difference between traditional
spammers and social spam bots is their social network: social bots exhibit more
followers than friends on average; the viceversa is true for traditional spam bots.
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Fig. 8 Distribution of tweet sentiment scores (SentiStrength) in the spam dataset.
The Interplay between Sentiment of Spam Bots
We conclude our analysis with a high-level investigation of the interplay between
spam sentiment and spam bot characteristics. We applied the same Sentiment Anal-
ysis technique, i.e., SentiStrength, as in the previous case study, to our spam dataset.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of sentiment scores for the tweets in our corpus. The
distribution exhibits its typical peak around zero [79, 37]. However, in contrast with
respect to previous findings on Twitter sentiment obtained using SentiStrength [37],
the distribution in the spam dataset appears skewed toward negativeness. In particu-
lar, roughly one order of magnitude more strongly negative tweets (S≤−3) appear
than strongly positive ones (S≥ 3).
Worth noting, this dataset is significantly smaller and topically biased (i.e., it cov-
ers only spam) than the comprehensive Twitter dataset we previously studied [37]:
we hypothesize that some correlation may exist between this atypical sentiment dis-
tribution and the role of spam bots.
To this purpose, in Figures 9–11 we plotted four features we used to characterize
the bots (i.e., number of posted tweets, obtained retweets, friends, and followers).
All figures report error bars (obtain hardly noticeable) that convey the standard error
of the sampled average feature distributions. We will use them for diagnostic pur-
pose, i.e., to highlight anomalies in spam dynamics with respect to organic social
media sentiment [37]. Given the exiguous number of tweets with extremely posi-
tive or negative sentiment (i.e., S = 4 or S =−4), next we will limit our analysis to
values of sentiment in the range −3≤ S≤ 3.
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Fig. 9 Average number of tweets posted as a function of tweet’s sentiment, calculated only on
tweets retweeted at most once (left) and on those that have been retweeted more than once (right).
Fig. 10 Average number of obtained retweets as a function of sentiment,calculated only on tweets
retweeted at most once (left) and on those that have been retweeted more than once (right).
Fig. 11 Average number of user friends as a function of sentiment, calculated only on tweets
retweeted at most once (left) and on those that have been retweeted more than once (right).
Fig. 12 Average number of user followers as a function of sentiment, calculated only on tweets
retweeted at most once (left) and on those that have been retweeted more than once (right).
The interpretations of the bar plots in Figures 9–11 is the following: given a fixed
value of sentiment x, then y is the average value of the selected feature for all tweets
with sentiment equal to x. Plots on the left are for the subset of tweets retweeted at
most once; plots on the right are for tweets retweeted more than once. The separation
is carried out to address the issue of activity heterogeneity highlighted before (cf.
Figure 5) and is necessary to avoid problems like the Simpson Paradox [87].
Measuring social spam and the effect of bots on information diffusion in social media 21
For sake of example, let us discuss the left panel of Figure 9 that shows the
distribution of the average number of tweets posted by users, which were retweeted
at most once, as a function of sentiment.
Let us consider sentiment S = 3 (there are about 1,300 such tweets in our dataset,
cf. Figure 8): the average number of tweets posted by the users who posted one
such tweet with sentiment S = 3 is about 92K. This is significantly higher than for
every other sentiment score, denoting the fact that users who post strongly positive
tweets (e.g., promotional tweets) on average posted significantly more tweets than
the others. It is also worth noting that an average value of tweets nearing the hundred
of thousands clearly denotes very highly-active accounts, and likely some form of
automatic posting—a common feature of spam bots.
The right panel of Figure 9 shows how this pattern is preserved even for the
set of tweets that have been retweeted more than once: moreover, the distribution
takes a U-like shape, suggesting that also accounts that post negative tweets exhibit
much more activity than average. This suggests that some spam campaigns may
not be necessarily positive. Indeed, if one compares this result with the previous
case study on the manipulation of political campaigns, some interesting similarities
emerge. In other words, spam at times can aim to smear some products, e.g., those
from competitors.
Figure 10 shows another interesting patterns. The left panel again captures tweets
that have been retweeted at most once; the right panel captures more popular tweets
and exhibits a striking difference if compared to the left one: increasingly positive
sentiment yields significantly more retweets. This is known as positivity bias, i.e.,
the emergence of a strong preference for retweeting positive messages; such bias
was already observed in our prior Twitter analysis [37]. Strongly positive tweets
obtain on average more than twice the number of retweets than negative or neutral
ones. It is worth hypothesizing that, in the spam scenario, this pattern may also
conceal some form of coordinated activity, i.e., bots may retweet other bots’ spam
in an orchestrated fashion.
Further clues supporting this hypothesis come from Figure 11, in particular the
right panel: users associated with positive tweets that are retweeted very often, all
exhibit a number of friends that is nearly twice as much as others. Inspecting users
who follow on average over 7K accounts revealed strong reciprocity—another very
common bot characteristic highlighted multiple times above.
Looking at the complementary picture, i.e. the distribution of followers reported
in Figure 12, reinforces our hypothesis: left and right panels illustrate two very
different scenarios, with the latter showing how users who post very positive or very
negative tweets attracted significantly fewer followers than others: bots involved in
spam campaigns do not commonly exhibit large followership (cf. Figure 6).
Concluding, our diagnostics revealed characteristic patterns that may conceal
clues to decode the strategies employed by spam bots to spread the content they
produce, and try giving spam a legitimate appearance.
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4 Conclusions
Social bots have become a pervasive presence in social media platforms. Applica-
tions of social bots have been documented in a variety of scenarios, including for
public opinion manipulation and for social spam campaigns. The focus of this chap-
ter was to investigate both these domains, and in particular to study the interplay
between bots and information diffusion in the two scenarios.
In Section §2, we reviewed how social bots are created, and how they operate in
social media platforms. We also briefly discussed the challenges of, and the meth-
ods to detecting them, covering techniques based on graph-centric detection, crowd-
sourcing, and traditional feature-based supervised learning.
Section §3.1 presented our first case study, discussing how social bots have been
used during the 2016 US Presidential Election to sway the conversation around
the presidential candidates. In this section we revised in detail the tools we used
for social bot detection, namely Bot Or Not, for Sentiment Analysis, namely Sen-
tiStrength, and for partisanship detection.
We also summarized the results of our study on political manipulation [11], pro-
viding in particular two data-driven insights: first, we noted that social bots generate
as much engagement, at least in terms of obtained retweets, than humans, suggest-
ing the fact that humans cannot tell apart bots from other humans very easily when
rebroadcasting politics-related information on Twitter. Second, we illustrated the in-
terplay between content sentiment and social bots, highlighting a few partisanship
differences (e.g., Trump bots single-handedly generated the most positive support-
ing content of their candidate in the entire analyzed dataset).
Finally, in Section §3.2 we proposed a second case study, and new results and
analyses about the effects of social spam bots on the diffusion of social spam cam-
paigns within the tobacco-related conversation on Twitter. First, we identified the
presence of three types of spam campaigns: (i) relative to tobacco products; (ii) rel-
ative to products unrelated to the tobacco industry, e.g., entertainment products; and,
finally, (iii) instances of topic hijacking, namely the use of hashtags and keywords
related to the tobacco industry to attract individuals’ attention on issues completely
unrelated to that, e.g., social issues connected to news events in the offline world.
By means of a newly-introduced method named Dynamical Activity-Connectivity
map, we also revealed the existence of different classes of spam accounts, including
traditional spammers and social spam bots; we also discussed a statistical charac-
terization of their most typical features. In conclusion, we provided an analysis of
the interplay between sentiment and spam bots, revealing patterns that may conceal
strategies of bot coordination, and the resulting effects in terms of spam diffusion.
Our findings in both case studies exemplify the potential for social media abuse:
whether at stakes is the right to exercise unbiased elections and therefore democracy
itself, or the exposure to illegitimate spam and propaganda, social media manipu-
lation can have devastating societal effects. This study encourages future efforts of
the research community to address the various facets of this form of abuse.
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